The existence of the longitudinal field B (3) in the vacuum implies that the gauge group of electrodynamics is O(3),and not U(1) [or O(2)].This results directly in the charge quantization condition e=h(ϰ/A (0)).This condition is derived independently in this paper from the relativistic motion of one electron in the field and is shown to he that in which the electron travels infinitesimally close to the speed of light.

In 1992 M.W. Evans proposed the O(3) symmetry of electromagnetic fields by adding a constant longitudinal magnetic field to the well-known transverse electric and magnetic fields of circularly polarized plane waves, such that certain cyclic relations of a so-called O(3) symmetry are fulfilled. Since then M.W. Evans has elevated this O(3) symmetry to the status of a new law of electromagnetics. As a law of physics must be invariant under admissible coordinate transforms, namely Lorentz transforms, in 2000 he (...) published a proof of the Lorentz invariance of O(3) symmetry of electromagnetic fields. As will be shown below this proof is incorrect; more, after simple correction it will turn out here that the O(3) symmetry cannot be Lorentz invariant. (shrink)

Using covariant derivatives and the operator definitions of quantum mechanics, gauge invariant Proca and Lehnert equations are derived and the Lorenz condition is eliminated in U(1) invariant electrodynamics. It is shown that the structure of the gauge invariant Lehnert equation is the same in an O(3) invariant theory of electrodynamics.

Pytanie Molyneux brzmi następująco: „Wystawmy sobie, iż niewidomy od urodzenia, obecnie człowiek dorosły, nauczył się odróżniać dotykiem sześcian od kuli i że stojący opodal ów niewidomy przejrzał; zapytuję, czy za pomocą odzyskanego wzroku, zanim dotknie tych przedmiotów, będzie mógł je rozpoznać i powiedzieć, który z nich jest kulą, a który sześcianem?” W niniejszym artykule wskazuję, że odpowiedź twierdząca, udzielona na to pytanie przez brytyjskiego filozofa Garetha Evansa jest nieprzekonująca, przede wszystkim dlatego, iż Evans nieświadomie pomija ilościowy czynnik dostępności informacji (...) zawartej w doświadczeniu zmysłowym. (shrink)

In recent years, the biological inheritance of what has been traditionally known as original sin has come more clearly to the fore. Examining the genetic forebears of Homo sapiens has allowed for a richer understanding of what exactly the "propagation" of original sin might really mean. The wounded imperfection of the human biological inheritance has clarified matters concerning the question of where exactly original sin comes from. Since the human experience of sentience and agency is built biologically upon the shoulders (...) of its ancestors, the human experience of being always-already bound by sin—an essential component of the meaning of original sin—comes into clearer relief. At the same time, a much richer... (shrink)

[Allen W. Wood] Kant's moral philosophy is grounded on the dignity of humanity as its sole fundamental value, and involves the claim that human beings are to be regarded as the ultimate end of nature. It might be thought that a theory of this kind would be incapable of grounding any conception of our relation to other living things or to the natural world which would value nonhuman creatures or respect humanity's natural environment. This paper criticizes Kant's argumentative strategy for (...) dealing with our duties in regard to animals, but defends both his theory and most of his conclusions on these topics. /// [Onora O'Neill] Kant's ethics, like others, has unavoidable anthropocentric starting points: only humans, or other 'rational natures', can hold obligations. Seemingly this should not make speciesist conclusions unavoidable: might not rational natures have obligations to the non-rational? However, Kant's argument for the unconditional value of rational natures cannot readily be extended to show that all non-human animals have unconditional value, or rights. Nevertheless Kant's speciesism is not thoroughgoing. He does not view non-rational animals as mere items for use. He allows for indirect duties 'with regard to' them which afford welfare but not rights, and can allow for indirect duties 'with regard to' abstract and dispersed aspects of nature, such as biodiversity, species and habitats. (shrink)

While top-down descriptors have received much attention in explaining corruption, we develop a grassroots model to describe structural factors that may influence the emergence and spread of an individual’s (un)ethical behavior within organizations. We begin with a discussion of the economics justification of the benefits of competition, a rationale used by firms to adopt structural aides such as the ‹stacking’ practice that was implemented at Enron. We discuss and develop an individual-level theory of planned behavior, then extend it to the (...) dyadic level in an internally competitive organization, and finally extend the dyadic model to the social network. We apply social network theory to predict favorable and unfavorable conditions for the emergence and diffusion of an intraorganizational instance of unethical behavior and find that network conditions favoring the suppression of the emergence of unethical behavior also promote its diffusion. For illustrative purposes, we utilize examples from Enron’s internally competitive structure to embed our arguments in a real world context and bring reality to our theorizing. Implications for both researchers and managers are discussed. (shrink)